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Abstract
1 
To what extent do imposed institutions shape preferences? We consider this issue 
by comparing the market-versus-state attitudes of respondents from a capitalist 
country, Finland, and an ex-communist group of Baltic countries, and by arguing 
that the period of communist rule can be viewed as an “experiment” in institutional 
imposition. We find that, consistent with some earlier related work, citizens from 
ex-communist countries tend to be more supportive of state ownership than 
respondents from capitalist economies. However, they also favor increasing 
inequality and competition as the means to enhance incentives. We conclude that, 
in some important relevant dimensions, institutional imposition (which lasted for 
about 50 years) had a limited effect on preferences. The lessons for Latin America 
are straightforward. 
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1. Introduction 
How do institutions interact with preferences, and hence with the choices societies make (see 
Rodrik, 2000, for a broad conceptual discussion of some of these issues)? Typically, in analytical 
modeling, the preferences of a politically powerful coalition play an important role in shaping 
institutions (Acemoglu, 2006), which is, of course, consistent with the neoclassical approach 
whereby exogenously given preferences determine economic outcomes. On the other hand, an 
almost equally classical view—the Marxist and Weberian traditions—holds that institutions shape 
preferences. It seems, in fact, that this latter view may have been recently embraced, perhaps 
inadvertently, in influential literature arguing that transplanted institutions have the potential to 
reform recipient economies in developing countries. In the context of the legal system, this 
argument has been forcefully made by La Porta et al. (1998); in the context of political and 
contract enforcement systems, work reviewed in Acemoglu (2006) attributes the success or lack 
thereof of former European colonies to whether good institutions were imposed on them by the 
colonizers; and Easterly and Levine (2003) reject the significance of economic policies for growth 
in favor of good institutions.
2 There are, it seems, examples in support of the view that 
institutional transplantation can work and have positive durable effects. Thus, some literature 
makes the point that pre-independence institutions in colonized parts of the world often 
persevered and were sustained after independence, so that, in a sense, modern institutions in these 
countries took root under colonization.
3   
For transplanted institutions to endure, however, they ultimately need to have political 
support. This necessarily implies that transplantation can work only insofar as it changes the 
collective preferences of the recipient population from rejecting good institutions to embracing 
them. Two different channels can lead to this change. Either transplanted institutions change the 
composition of politically decisive constituencies or they change individual preferences through 
habitual addiction, for example. In this paper, we are interested in studying this second channel. 
Some related recent work, such as Corneo and Gruner (2002) and Alesina and Fuchs-Schuendeln 
(2005), examines attitudes toward the role of the state in the 1990s and finds significant 
                                                           
2 The despair over the apparent inability to break the poverty cycle in parts of the developing world has even led the 
chief economist of the IMF to propose that a benevolent foreign authority run a poverty stricken country for a period 
in order to establish decent institutions (Rajan, 2005).  
3 Ferguson (2003) argues that British colonization often had lasting beneficial economic effects, at least relative to 
other colonizing powers. The line of research that was initiated by Sokoloff and Engerman (2000) suggests that 
institutional change is more likely to have favorable consequences if supported by a more equal distribution of 
economic resources.     5
differences between West European market economies and the formerly communist countries of 
East Europe, with individuals in the second group being more favorable toward state ownership. 
Alesina and Fuchs-Schuendeln (2005) attribute this difference to the durable effect that the 
existing institutional environment has on the formation of preferences. 
On the other hand, there are other examples where institutional change, inasmuch as it was 
forcibly imposed, did not endure. The relatively rapid transition of the former communist 
countries to market economies (see Shleifer and Treisman, 2005) illustrates precisely that. As will 
be argued in more detail below, the Russian revolution of 1917 entailed a decisive institutional 
change, dealing a death blow to the previously existing elites. Further, it led to a much more 
egalitarian distribution of economic resources than before, as well as to an ideological 
commitment to and relatively successful implementation of universal literacy, mass education, 
national health, and public housing. It is commonly agreed that as a result of these 
commitments—despite all the well-known problems and the frequent ruthlessness of their 
implementation—the degree of economic inequality in the Soviet Union, as well as in other 
countries within the Soviet domain, was among the lowest in the world.  
Yet the system, which was mercilessly imposed for decades, did not endure and was 
overthrown when an opportunity presented itself in the late 1980s as a result of Gorbachev’s 
policy reversal. One country after another engaged in economic liberalization and in attempts to 
reinvigorate private entrepreneurship.
4 This important recent example—or, rather, set of 
examples, since the system was implemented in about one-third of the world’s countries—leads  
to several observations. One is that decisively and abruptly breaking up an old order with 
inefficient institutions and creating an alternative regime with commitments to equality is in itself 
no guarantee of economic success. The institutions created as a consequence of the Russian 
revolution, including central planning and state ownership, were thrown out as soon as the 
citizens were given free choice. As the data explored below seems to suggest, the populace in 
Soviet-dominated countries had developed a deep sense of dissatisfaction with economic 
equality—probably the most important tenet of the economic regime and one that had been 
promoted for decades through school indoctrination, the mass media, the silencing of any 
discontent, and the repression of dissidents.  
                                                           
4 As is shown in Beck and Laeven (2005), there is a negative relationship between the amount of time countries spent 
under the communist system and their growth rates during the transition years.   6
While revealed behavior—the relatively decisive move away from the communist system 
that occurred in many transition countries—speaks for itself, at least two important issues remain 
unsettled. First, it is not quite clear what specific aspects of the communist system aroused 
objection, leaving open the possibility that some features were acceptable or even approved. 
Second, it is unclear how widespread was opposition to the system; did it reflect mass disapproval 
or just the views of a relatively small group of interested parties? 
To study these issues, we examine the emergence of the Soviet Union and, in particular, 
the imposition of a communist regime on some of its neighbors. The argument is that some of 
these cases come close to being “experiments” and thus enable us to study the likelihood of a 
long-lasting imprint resulting from deep institutional change. Specifically, we compare the Baltic 
States, which came under Soviet occupation in 1940 and were part of the Soviet Union until 1988, 
and Finland, which fought the Soviet military invasion and remained independent throughout. 
Arguing that the economic and social outlook of the Baltic States and Finland was similar in the 
period predating the Soviet invasion, we then study how the imposition of the Soviet model, with 
its emphasis on state planning and economic equality, affected the views of the citizens in each of 
those areas. 
We are able to replicate the previous findings that individuals in former communist 
countries tend to view state ownership and reliance on state support more approvingly than 
individuals in market-oriented economies. However, we also find strong evidence of their 
willingness to accept unequal distribution of income and to be exposed to more competition in 
order to enhance incentives. We regard these findings as proof that institutional imposition may 
not be durable, especially if it is not perceived to be successful. Taken together, they seem to 
imply that when compared to a relevant group, individuals in the former communist countries 
welcomed at least some elements of transition to the capitalist system, such as increased 
competition, and were perfectly willing to accept growing inequality as the means to increase 
efficiency; but they were also reluctant to give up on government responsibilities. Moreover, 
during the course of the transition decade in the 1990s, these relative attitudes changed 
remarkably little, despite the wave of mass privatization in the Baltics in the early 1990s.  
We also find some tentative evidence that individual trust as well as confidence in 
government generally boosts support for capitalistic institutions and may partly account for the 
differences in attitudes between the Finnish and the Baltic respondents. We argue that 
understanding these distinctions may be helpful for conducting institutional reforms.   7
To summarize, the question of the relevance of institutions for development can be 
usefully divided into two somewhat separate although arguably related components. One is 
whether an imposed, or transplanted, institutional change can promote economic performance. It 
is this issue that has been most directly addressed by the recent literature. Another question, 
however, is to what extent imposed institutions are durable and can be sustained over time, 
especially when citizens in the recipient countries are able to exercise at least some political will. 
This paper addresses the second question. 
This paper is related to the literature, some of which is mentioned above, that studies the 
determinants of high-quality institutions. Berkowitz et al. (2003) find in the context of 
transplanted (legal) institutions that their legality is no less important than their inherent quality; 
Rodrik (2000) suggests that appropriate institutions may differ across countries; and Rajan and 
Zingales (2006) argue that supportive constituencies are essential for the ultimate success of an 
institutional change. Since the particular institution addressed in this study is inequality and its 
subject matter is the attitudes toward the role of government, the paper is also related to the work 
that studies the determinants of such attitudes. This work has mainly been done in the context of 
the comparison between the United States, with its reliance on markets and relatively high 
inequality, and Europe, with its state provided social protection—see Alesina and Glaeser (2004) 
and references therein. In the U.S. context, Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) relate preferences for 
redistribution and social mobility.
5 Some more recent work has also been done comparing 
attitudes within Europe, such as between Western and Eastern European countries (Corneo and 
Gruner, 2002; Alesina and Fuchs-Schuendeln, 2005). This work typically finds that individuals in 
the former communist countries tend to favor more state intervention than their Western 
counterparts; the authors then attribute the finding to habit formation or the effects of 
indoctrination. In contrast, Shiller et al. (1991, 1992) compare the United States and the Soviet 
Union in the early 1990s and do not find significant differences in regard to attitudes toward 
markets. Further, Di Tella and MacCulloch (2004) find that individuals in developing countries 
are generally quite suspicious of the institutions of capitalism, such as markets and private 
ownership. While concurring with these findings, we also provide evidence that individuals in ex-
communist countries favor more inequality and competition to enhance incentives. Thus, while 
they were suspicious toward private ownership, these individuals were perfectly willing to 
support other essential capitalistic elements viewed as important for economic incentives. From 
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the viewpoint of the prospects for positive institutional change in a developing country, this 
conclusion can thus be considered as reflecting guarded optimism. On the other hand, we do not 
find much support in the data for theories suggesting that mass privatization creates constituencies 
in favor of further market reforms (see Biais and Perotti, 2002); at least within the span of a 
decade, the attitudes of the citizens in the Baltic states remained relatively stable despite the wave 
of mass privatization in the early 1990s. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section describes the historical and 
institutional background. Section 3 then deals with data description. Section 4 presents some basic 
empirical findings, with a more detailed analysis in Section 5. Section 6 then concludes with 
discussion and interpretations. 
2. Background 
2.1  Historical Details 
Russia. In the first half of the nineteenth century, tsarist Russia was a very traditional society, 
with a patrimonial state fully controlled by an autocratic bureaucracy. Land and mining were 
highly concentrated, and most peasants were serfs. The judiciary was an integral part of the 
governing system, and religion was a solid part of the state mechanism. Reforms in the 1860s 
were designed to institute a more modern system of governance, with a modicum of separation of 
powers and abolishment of serfdom. The pace of their implementation was uneven, however, and 
only after two or three decades did some elements of modernization begin to manifest themselves. 
While the reforms gave impetus to the emergence of the bourgeoisie and to relatively rapid 
industrialization, they also exacerbated poverty (see Pipes, 1995).   
The beginning of the twentieth century was characterized by some continuing attempts at 
reform, along with the regime’s confrontations with the emerging working class. The attempted 
1905 revolution was followed by severe repression, which was in turn followed by the Stolypin 
land reforms of 1910-11. The Russo-Japanese War and World War I contributed to a severe and 
ongoing economic and social crisis. Though the 1917 revolution resulted in the abdication of the 
tsar and the formation of an elected government seemingly committed to progressive social 
reforms, the continuing war and a lack of visible economic progress brought about another, much 
more radical revolution led by Lenin’s Bolshevik party (Walkin, 1962).   
The ensuing civil war from 1918-1922, combined with droughts from 1920-1921, further 
contributed to the devastation of the country that became known as the Soviet Union, which   9
defined itself as a federation of republics. The revolution decisively upset the previous balance of 
power, practically eliminated the ruling elite, and led to the emergence of new institutions.
6 In the 
late 1920s, in order to promote rapid industrialization, Stalin collectivized farms and imposed 
state ownership and central planning (Pipes, 1993). Massive investment, especially in heavy 
industries, brought about a period of strong economic growth. Much progress was also made in 
education—which was viewed as both a vehicle for modernization and a means of socializing 
individuals into the ruling ideology—and in the areas of science, health, and infrastructure. 
Although subsequently there were important deviations from these policies, they remained in 
place until Gorbachev introduced major changes in the late 1980s. While the Soviet Union’s 
economic growth was initially very impressive, it slowed down considerably by the 1960s (see 
Nove, 1992). During the entire period of communist rule, all aspects of democratic governance—
such as free elections, an independent media, and the freedom of speech and of political 
organization—were absent throughout the Soviet-dominated areas. 
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. During the period 1918-1940, the Soviet Union 
evolved as a political federation of separate republics. It came into being in 1922 as a union of the 
Russian, Ukrainian, Belorusian, and Transcaucasian republics. The autonomy and right of 
secession granted to the republics by the constitution were purely theoretical; political control was 
centralized. Some territories previously belonging to Imperial Russia—in particular, the Baltics—
were lost in the course of the turbulent aftermath of the revolution. In 1940, however, some of 
these territories were regained as a result of a pact with Nazi Germany; thus, Moldavia, Estonia, 
Latvia, and Lithuania joined as new republics. Parts of Poland and Finland were also 
incorporated. By 1940, the Soviet Union had regained almost the entire territory of Imperial 
Russia, with the important exceptions of parts of Poland and Finland. 
In the aftermath of World War II and as a part of the emerging Cold War, Stalin 
strengthened his grip on neighboring countries through political and military pressure, as well as 
through the signing of economic and military agreements. As a result, countries in Eastern 
Europe, including Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, and East Germany, 
came to be dominated by communist regimes with fairly similar ideologies and policies to that of 
the Soviet Union.
7   
                                                           
6 The strict economic discipline, known as War Communism, was eased in the aftermath of the Bolshevik victory, 
and the New Economic Policy briefly introduced elements of free markets.   
7 Yugoslavia, although following a distinct path, professed like-minded communist ideologies.   10
The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the transition period. In the late 1980s, 
Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev embarked upon a series of reforms. In the economic sphere, 
they primarily meant relaxation of state control, abolishment of central planning, and mass 
privatization. In the political sphere, they led to democratization and to the dismantling of the 
Soviet Union in 1991, with its 15 constituent republics becoming independent states. 
The reforms also had consequences beyond the Soviet borders. Revolutionary movements 
spread all over the Eastern bloc, resulting in the ousting of the regimes imposed after World War 
II. One country after another replaced the prevailing communist regime with another, less 
centralized governance system and a variation of the market economy. East Germany reunified 
with West Germany in 1990, and the pacts and agreements between the Soviet Union and the 
neighboring countries were dissolved. 
The transition period proceeded very differently in the different countries. This can be 
seen most clearly by comparing the growth rates across the transition economies. For example, in 
the period 1992-2002, average real income per capita in countries like Estonia and Poland grew at 
an annual rate of about 4 percent; in Ukraine it shrank by more than 4 percent;  and in Russia it 
shrank by less than 1percent (Beck and Laeven, 2002). The political and economic reform pace 
greatly differed across the transition economies as well. By 2004-2005, income per capita in 
several transition economies, such as Slovenia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Estonia was 
approaching $20,000; whereas in Belarus and Ukraine it stagnated at less than $4,000 (World 
Development Indicators).   
2.2  Finland and the Baltic States 
We would like to argue that the formation of the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc and their 
subsequent disintegration constitutes a unique social experiment—in fact, several of them—in 
particular creating a division between market-oriented economies in the West and planned 
economies in Eastern Europe. The above historical account helps us in the identification.  
Finland and the Baltic States, which are the focus here, share many common historical 
features. Previously loosely controlled by the Russian Empire, they became independent as a 
consequence of the Russian Revolution of 1917. They then had to quickly set up their own 
national institutions and define their respective identities. All of them opted for democratic 
governance and a multiparty system. Comprehensive land reforms and advanced social legislation   11
were high on the agendas of the new parliaments, which were dominated for the most part by 
right-wing nationalistic parties. 
They were also able to successfully develop their economies and build their respective 
social fabrics. In the 1930s, all these countries were relatively poor by Western European 
standards, with  per capita incomes of about $3,000 in Finland and almost that in Estonia and 
Latvia—about one half of per capita income in the United States at the time. Although 
industrialization began taking off, agriculture and foresting were still the dominant sectors. As a 
result of a land reform that took place in all these countries in or around 1920, the number of 
small farmers grew considerably, the tenancy problem was almost completely resolved, and 
agricultural production rapidly increased. All these countries—especially Finland and Estonia—
developed extensive trade relationships with other European countries, in particular Germany and 
England. Industry—initially based on a particular niche, such as timber in Finland or textiles in 
Estonia—gradually became more diversified (wood products, paper pulp, some oil products), and 
its relative share in total output increased. All these countries suffered significantly as a result of 
the Great Depression, but managed to rebound, so that in the late 1930s, standards of living were 
increasing, with minimal unemployment. Notably, almost universal literacy was achieved early in 
the twentieth century, at least in Finland, Estonia, and Latvia, so that in the 1930s there was 
practically no illiteracy, and school standards across the Baltic states were relatively very high. 
Also, social legislation—women’s suffrage, child labor regulations, social insurance for disability 
and old age—was among the most progressive in the world. Even political developments were 
similar in these countries in many regards, with right-wing nationalistic governments dominating 
the scene. All these suggest that, in relevant aspects, these countries were similar in the interwar 
period. 
In 1940, the Soviet Union managed to reacquire the Baltic states (and a part of Finland) 
through a pact with Germany, whereas Finland fought off the Soviet army and retained 
independence. Since the governments in all these countries were formed by right-wing parties 
vehemently opposed to communist influence, these developments can be regarded as being solely 
due to a geopolitical reality that had nothing to do with any social differences between Finland 
and the Baltic states. The period from World War II through the disintegration of the Soviet 
Union saw an independent and democratic Finland, whereas the Baltic states came to be fully 
dominated by the centralized Soviet bureaucracy. In 1990, despite very different economic   12
systems, income inequality levels across all these countries were roughly similar, with Gini 
coefficients varying between 0.25-0.27, among the smallest in the world.   
To summarize, Finland and the Baltic states shaped themselves in very similar ways 
during the interwar period—economically, socially, and politically. Therefore, the Soviet invasion 
of the latter and the subsequent imposition of the communist regime there, as opposed to its defeat 
in the former, provide an opportunity to compare the long-run effects of an imposed institutional 
regime. 
3. Data 
Our data sources are the European and World Values Survey (WVS), two worldwide surveys 
conducted by the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) that 
consist of individual cross-national responses to a variety of questions on topics including the 
economy, politics, and identity, and includes the socio-economic background of the respondents. 
The data are derived from face-to-face interviews with people 18 years of age and older from 83 
developed and developing countries. Four survey rounds have been conducted: 1981 (Wave 1); 
1990-1993 (Wave 2); 1995-1997 (Wave 3), and 1999-2001 (Wave 4). Altogether, these amount to 
more than 267,000 individual responses, or an average of 66,000 per survey.
8 
Within each country, the sample design and fieldwork was done by professional survey 
organizations with great experience (most of them members of the Gallup chain). In other cases, it 
was carried out by national academies of sciences or university-based institutes. Each sample has 
a multistage design and random selection of sampling points after stratification by region and 
degree of urbanization. National samples were used in all countries, but some of them were done 
just using country subsamples (Russia, Northern Ireland, Chile, Puerto Rico, Argentina, India, 
Nigeria, and China). The response rates vary significantly, going from 25 percent in Spain to 95 
percent in Slovakia. To correct for the sample design and the response rate, sample weights were 
constructed with specific criteria for each country; a more detailed description of the variables 
used can be found in Appendix 1.  
Our main questions of interest were the following:  
 (i) OPINION ABOUT INCOME REDISTRIBUTION   
                                                           
8 In practice, we are able to use only the second, third, and fourth rounds of the survey since our questions of interest 
were included in those surveys. Taking this restriction into account, our final sample is reduced to 228,469 individual 
respondents from 83 countries.   13
How would you place your views on this scale? 1 means you agree completely with the 
statement on the left (Incomes should be made more equal.); 10 means you agree 
completely with the statement on the right (We need larger income differences as 
incentives.). 
 (ii) OPINION ABOUT COMPETITION   
How would you place your views on this scale? 1 means you agree completely with the 
statement on the left (Competition is harmful. It brings out the worst in people.); 10 means 
you agree completely with the statement on the right (Competition is good. It stimulates 
people to work hard and develop new ideas.). 
 
In addition, for the sake of comparison with previous studies such as Corneo and Gruner 
(2002) and Alesina and Fuchs-Schuendeln (2005), we present data pertaining to views on the role 
of the state: 
(iii) OPINION ABOUT GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP  
How would you place your views on this scale? 1= Government ownership of business 
and industry should increase; 10= Private ownership of business and industry should 
increase.  
 
We will focus on Finland and the Baltic states—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—because 
we consider the historical paths of these countries to most closely resemble an “experiment.” For 
the sake of robustness, we will however also refer to results pertaining to additional, more 
comprehensive groupings, which are described in more detail below. 
4. A Look at the Data: The Big Picture 
We begin by presenting some very broad data regularities. Table 1 presents the average of 




                                                           
9 A fuller description of the distributions of the main variables of interest and the correlations between them can be 
found in Appendices 2 and 3.   14
Table 1. Opinions among Respondents in Finland and in the Baltic States* 
 
   Survey years  Finland  Baltic states 
1990-1993 6.62  7.48 
1995-1997 4.16  5.78 
Larger income inequality is an incentive. 
1999-2000 4.60  6.01 
1990-1993 7.60  8.19 
1995-1997 7.17  7.65 
Competition is good. It stimulates people to work
hard and develop new ideas. 
1999-2000 6.71  7.07 
1990-1993 7.35  6.67 
1995-1997 6.78  5.68 
Ownership of business and industry should 
increase. 
1999-2000 6.80  5.65 
1990-1993 22.9  29.3 
1995-1997 25.2  33.0 
GINI coefficient 
1999-2000 26.9  35.3 
1990-1993 -3.4%  -12.4% 
1995-1997 4.2%  6.3% 
Average per capita growth rates  
1999-2000 3.0%  5.2% 
 
(*) Averages of responses. 
 
In the three waves used for this paper, the Baltic survey respondents are interested in 
larger income differences to increase incentives and more competition than the Finnish 
respondents. At the same time, and in line with previous studies, they opt for more government 
ownership. The differences in responses are significant, and they remained almost unchanged 
during the 1990s. During the study period, income inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient 
increased in all the countries, though somewhat more so in the Baltic States than in Finland. The 
Baltic States experienced a steep growth decline in the early 1990s, followed by rapid economic 
growth during the third and fourth survey waves; Finnish growth changes—while exhibiting 
similar patterns—were somewhat less volatile. 
Table 2 shows the response averages from three groups of countries. One group consists 
of the original members of the Soviet Union that entered into federation in 1918. Another group 
consists of certain Eastern European countries that came under communist domination in World 
War II, or, more, precisely, at the beginning of the Cold War. These countries include those that 
were under direct Soviet domination, such as Poland or Hungary, as well as those that were 
perhaps inspired by the Soviet example but pursued their own relatively independent paths, such   15
as Yugoslavia. A third comparison group of countries includes West European democracies with 
well-developed welfare states (Sweden, Norway, and Denmark).
10 
 
Table 2. Opinions among Respondents in Former Communist 
Eastern European Countries versus a Sample of West European Countries 
 









1990-1993 6.12  6.92  7.33 
1995-1997 5.58  5.22  6.36 
Larger income inequality is an 
incentive. 
1999-2000 5.66  5.29  6.81 
1990-1993 7.84  8.04  7.71 
1995-1997 7.58  7.59  7.04 
Competition is good. It 
stimulates people to work hard 
and develop new ideas.   
1999-2000 7.60  7.69  7.01 
1990-1993 6.84  6.98  5.41 
1995-1997 6.56  6.15  3.85 
Ownership of business and 
industry should increase. 
1999-2000 7.33  6.37  5.20 
1990-1993 30.8  26.2  28.3 
1995-1997 31.1  28.5  42.0 
GINI coefficient 
1999-2000 27.4  30.7  37.9 
1990-1993 0.4%  -5.8%  -12.9% 
1995-1997 3.0%  8.5%  0.1% 
Average per capita growth rates  
1999-2000 2.3%  3.  3%  5.6% 
 
*Includes Denmark, Norway, and Sweden; **Includes Albania, Bulgaria, parts of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, 
East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Romania; ***Includes Belarus, Georgia, Russian Federation, and Ukraine; 
averages of responses. 
 
The results are quite revealing. Comparing the average responses across the three groups 
leads to the conclusion that the longer the exposure to communism, the more averse individuals 
are to equality and the more approving they are of competition.  Respondents from the communist 
                                                           
10 We played with the composition of this group, including adding Western European countries, without significant 
changes in the results.   16
countries also view government ownership more approvingly than their Western counterparts. 
Thus, respondents from core areas of the Soviet Union seem to be most averse to the equality 
ideal propagated by the Soviet system, viewing it perhaps as an impediment to good incentives, 
whereas the Western European welfare states are most open to it and respondents in the post-1945 
communist-dominated countries take intermediate positions. These findings hold true for all three 
survey waves. Comparing these results with those in Table 1, we see an almost exact replication 
of the pattern; specifically, more time spent under a communist regime leads individuals to prefer 
a less equitable and more competitive regime and to be less satisfied with their own regime. 
Finally, Table 3 contains an ordered probit regression with country groupings as above, 
with the group of 1918-1990 communist countries constituting the baseline. It follows that all 
groups are interested in having less inequality, with Finland and the Western European welfare 
states being the most interested, followed by the former communist countries and then the Baltic 
countries. With respect to competition, the countries with the longest exposure to communism 
favor it the most, while Finland and the Western European welfare states do not tend to prefer it. 
Finally, when it comes to private ownership, these results are basically reversed; the Finnish and 
Western European welfare states are the ones who have stronger preferences for it, while the 
Baltic states and the other former communist countries have weaker preferences. These findings 
are consistent with those presented in Tables 1 and 2 above. The results in this table also indicate 
that, between the second wave and the third and fourth waves, there was a secular increase in the 
willingness to redistribute, and in the desire for more government ownership and less competition. 
Furthermore—and consistent with the Meltzer-Richard (1981) paradigm—white-collar 
individuals with higher incomes and better education are less prone to favor redistribution, and 
are more open to competition, personal responsibility, and private ownership than others. 
Younger individuals as well as working individuals seem to exhibit similar preferences, although 
the statistical significance here is less clear. 
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Table 3. Illustrative Regressions for Countries of Interest 
 
  Larger income differences  Competition is good  Increase private 
ownership 
Age 35-54  -0.114  -0.088  -0.278 
 (2.24)**  (3.05)***  (4.22)*** 
Age 55 or more  -0.079  -0.137  -0.392 
 (12.74)***  (5.50)***  (2.73)*** 
Gender (male=1)  0.116  0.165  0.162 
 (1.98)**  (7.78)***  (8.47)*** 
Secondary education  0.280  0.018  0.134 
 (5.82)***  (0.43)  (2.17)** 
Tertiary education  0.307  0.121  0.425 
 (6.80)***  (3.27)***  (6.69)*** 
Married 0.066  -0.025  -0.066 
 (12.69)***  (3.87)***  (4.88)*** 
Number of children  0.004  0.010  0.008 
 (0.73)  (1.60)  (6.72)*** 
Retired -0.115  -0.066  -0.238 
 (5.64)***  (3.04)***  (3.99)*** 
Unemployed -0.067  -0.067  -0.042 
 (1.30)  (1.66)*  (3.49)*** 
White-collar worker  0.110  0.151  0.196 
 (1.88)*  (18.17)***  (28.05)*** 
Deciles of incomes  0.057  0.034  0.039 
 (20.27)***  (14.29)***  (11.24)*** 
Communist domination  
1940-1990 
-0.345 0.288  0.905 
 (2.78)***  (3.34)***  (6.46)*** 
Northern welfare states  -0.599  0.013  0.841 
 (6.60)***  (0.26)  (12.05)*** 
Baltic States  -0.278  0.175  0.631 
 (2.22)**  (3.45)***  (9.05)*** 
Finland -0.641  0.015  1.325 
 (11.06)***  (0.44)  (34.72)*** 
Wave 1995-1997  -0.636  -0.195  -0.228 
 (5.16)***  (3.93)***  (2.24)** 
Wave 1999-2000  -0.620  -0.247  -0.017 
 (3.60)***  (4.25)***  (0.15) 
Pseudo R-squared  0.04  0.01  0.08 
Observations 38,220  41,102  35,911 
All are ordered probit regressions corrected for clusters; also, robust z-statistics in parentheses. (*) statistically 
significant at 10 percent; (**) statistically significant at 5 percent; (***) statistically significant at 1 percent. 
Columns (1) and (3) do not include information for the Northern welfare states in the last survey round. 
 
We next proceed with a more specific and focused empirical analysis.   18
5. Results 
The empirical analysis focuses on comparing the Finnish and Baltic respondents’ attitudes.
11 As 
argued above, the period of the Soviet occupation of the latter, from 1945-90, is viewed as an 
“experiment,” during the course of which the Baltic states were exposed to communist institutions 
and values. Our primary interest is to understand how this exposure has affected the respondents’ 
attitudes toward equality and redistribution, as well as toward state involvement. Here we run 
ordered probit regressions, using robust and clustered standard errors in order to control for 
possible heteroskedasticity and possible correlation within the responses of each country, 
respectively. 
5.1  Empirical Evidence 
The basic regression results are presented in Table 4 and include the last three waves of the 
survey.
12 They show that employed, higher-income, better-educated individuals in white-collar 
occupations favor greater inequality, more competition, and private ownership; gender also 
matters, with males likewise exhibiting more pro-capitalist attitudes—i.e., more inequality, 
competition, and private ownership—relative to females. Also, younger individuals are more pro-
capitalist than older ones—consistent with earlier findings, such as in Ravallion and Lokshin 
(2000). More importantly for our purposes, there are differences between the respondents in 
Finland and in the Baltic states: the dummy variable for the latter is significant, highly so when it 
comes to attitudes toward inequality. Generally, in the course of the 1990s, preferences for 
income redistribution have increased, especially when comparing the third wave with the second 
one.
13 
Note that in regard to the issue of state ownership, we replicate earlier results from Alesina 
and Fuchs-Schuendeln (2005), observing that income, younger age, employment, and education 
level all reinforce pro-state attitudes. There also are differences between the two types of 
countries; respondents from the Baltic states prefer less private ownership than Finnish 
                                                           
11 For robustness, we have also replicated the analysis comparing Finland with Estonia, the most similar country 
among the Baltic states. The results get even somewhat stronger in this case. We prefer to report the Baltic states’ 
regression specification, however, because it contains about twice as many respondents.  
12 A separate analysis of the second wave only, conducted right after the fall of the communist system, yields very 
similar results. 
13 For the sake of economy, we only include the marginal effects of selected coefficients in Table 4. They are 
presented more completely in Appendix 4. Additional results for this table and for the rest of the tables in this paper 
may be provided upon request.   19
respondents. These results, also obtained in Alesina and Fuchs-Schuendeln (2005) are, again, 
highly significant.  
 
Table 4. Baltic Countries and Finland 
 
 
 Larger  income 
differences 
Competition is good  Increase private 
ownership 
Age 35-54  -0.253  -0.177  -0.056 
 (7.21)***  (17.75)***  (1.80)* 
Age over 55   -0.051  -0.062  0.090 
 (5.26)***  (2.76)***  (1.41) 
Gender (1=male)  0.254  0.097  0.088 
 (18.02)***  (14.22)***  (3.95)*** 
Secondary education  0.152  -0.127  -0.013 
 (23.11)***  (3.99)***  (2.24)** 
Tertiary education  0.266  -0.136  0.128 
 (7.48)***  (1.22)  (3.48)*** 
Married 0.043  -0.086  -0.129 
 (5.52)***  (4.24)***  (28.48)*** 
Number of children  -0.010  0.028  0.018 
 (10.61)***  (9.11)***  (9.99)*** 
Retired -0.160  -0.098  -0.442 
 (24.95)***  (14.46)***  (6.99)*** 
Unemployed -0.148  0.010  -0.105 
 (16.21)***  (0.73)  (7.33)*** 
White-collar worker  0.288  0.225  0.266 
 (16.91)***  (8.47)***  (10.03)*** 
Scale of incomes  0.063  0.041  0.034 
 (10.72)***  (5.46)***  (9.78)*** 
Wave 1995-1997  -0.723  -0.410  -0.377 
 (6.94)***  (5.22)***  (2.36)** 
Wave 1999-2000  -0.659  -0.584  -0.375 
 (3.84)***  (5.55)***  (1.64) 
Baltic States  0.503  0.320  -0.592 
 (3.21)***  (4.30)***  (9.14)*** 
Pseudo R-squared  0.04  0.01  0.02 
Observations 8,580  9,212  8,301 
 
All are ordered probit regressions corrected for clusters; also, robust z-statistics in parentheses. Data for Latvia 
for the 1999-2001 round are not available in columns (1) and (3); (*) statistically significant at 10 percent; 
(**) statistically significant at 5 percent; (***) statistically significant at 1 percent. 
 
 
In summary, we observe that the communist legacy seems to have had an impact on the 
attitudes of respondents in the Baltic States in the following ways: they prefer more inequality and 
more competition as a means of enhancing incentives, while at the same time favor more 
government ownership than their Finnish counterparts.   20
5.2  The Effect of Transition 
Having data on the transition decade enables us to analyze whether the above differences in 
attitudes between ex-communist and Western European countries narrow over time. To do so, we 
run regressions as above, but also include the interactive terms with survey waves. 
 
Table 5. Baltic Countries and Finland: Interactive Dummies 
 
  Larger income differences  Competition is good  Increase private 
ownership 
Age 35-54  -0.253  -0.177  -0.057 
 (7.24)***  (17.64)***  (1.81)* 
Age 55 and above  -0.051  -0.063  0.089 
 (5.61)***  (2.78)***  (1.38) 
Gender (1=male)  0.254  0.096  0.087 
 (17.97)***  (14.79)***  (3.99)*** 
Secondary education  0.154  -0.125  -0.009 
 (40.03)***  (3.77)***  (1.11) 
Tertiary education  0.275  -0.131  0.139 
 (13.36)***  (1.20)  (4.03)*** 
Married 0.043  -0.087  -0.130 
 (5.50)***  (4.30)***  (25.09)*** 
Number of children  -0.010  0.028  0.018 
 (10.84)***  (9.13)***  (10.01)*** 
Retired -0.160  -0.096  -0.438 
 (27.64)***  (16.05)***  (6.81)*** 
Unemployed -0.148 0.011  -0.103 
 (17.24)***  (0.81)  (7.15)*** 
White-collar worker  0.288  0.222  0.259 
 (16.10)***  (8.06)***  (9.21)*** 
Scale of incomes  0.063  0.042  0.035 
 (11.25)***  (5.87)***  (8.86)*** 
Baltic States  0.470  0.458  -0.344 
 (3.86)***  (3.58)***  (2.78)*** 
Wave 1995-1997  -0.745  -0.294  -0.165 
 (30.19)***  (5.67)***  (7.29)*** 
Wave 1999-2000  -0.785  -0.462  -0.168 
 (32.22)***  (13.24)***  (9.45)*** 
Baltic*wave 1995-
1997 
0.013 -0.158  -0.287 
 (0.08)  (1.48)  (1.53) 
Baltic*wave 1999-
2000 
0.185 -0.150  -0.249 
 (0.77)  (0.99)  (0.83) 
Pseudo R-squared  0.04  0.01  0.02 
Observations 8,580  9,212  8,301 
   
 
All are ordered probit regressions corrected for clusters; robust z-statistics in parentheses. Data for Latvia for the 
1999-2001 round are not available in columns (1) and (3). All regressions include country clusters; (*) statistically 
significant at 10 percent; (**) statistically significant at 5 percent; (***) statistically significant at 1 percent. 
We observe that the coefficients of the interactive terms between the Baltics and the 
survey waves are all insignificant. In particular, the differences in support for income inequality 
and competition have remained similar between these groups, with the Baltic countries showing a 
higher preference for both during the 1990s. Recalling that the Baltic states experienced a wave of   21
mass privatization in early 1990s, this finding can be interpreted as implying that mass 
privatization does not necessarily—at least in the span of several years—develop a sense of 
identification with markets by creating constituencies with stakes in them, as suggested by some 
important recent work (Biais and Perotti, 2002). 
5.3  Individual vs. Government Responsibility 
So far, the results seem to be contradictory: citizens in the Baltic states favor higher inequality to 
boost incentives, but also more state involvement than Finnish citizens. To highlight the 
contradiction, we now include in our base specification an additional variable that captures 
opinions on individual responsibility as opposed to government responsibility. 
The results in Table 6 suggest that individual responsibility is positively linked with more 
inequality, and with a more market-oriented economy. In general, therefore, it appears that 
individuals who consider personal responsibility more favorably also like more competition, more 
inequality, and more private ownership. (While this holds for both groups, Finnish citizens are 
somewhat more pronounced in their support of more income inequality, whereas Baltic 
respondents are somewhat more pronounced in their support for more competition and more 
private ownership.)  
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Table 6. Baltic Countries and Finland: Government Responsibility 
 
 Larger  income 
differences 
Competition is good  Increase private 
ownership 
Age 35-54  -0.198  -0.178  -0.048 
 (6.64)***  (15.56)***  (1.68)* 
Age 55 and above   -0.058  -0.061  0.077 
 (7.00)***  (3.09)***  (1.30) 
Gender (1=male)  0.231  0.097  0.093 
 (16.43)***  (18.21)***  (5.28)*** 
Secondary education  0.092  -0.123  -0.022 
 (21.65)***  (3.84)***  (2.38)** 
Tertiary education  0.212  -0.150  0.095 
 (4.43)***  (1.41)  (2.58)*** 
Married 0.000  -0.095  -0.141 
 (0.14)  (4.12)***  (46.38)*** 
Number of children  -0.010  0.028  0.019 
 (13.49)***  (8.98)***  (9.88)*** 
Retired -0.091  -0.089  -0.407 
 (8.19)***  (13.24)***  (6.85)*** 
Unemployed -0.100  0.016  -0.060 
 (8.72)***  (1.07)  (5.76)*** 
White-collar worker  0.268  0.226  0.265 
 (15.53)***  (8.60)***  (10.14)*** 
Scale of incomes  0.054  0.044  0.036 
 (8.56)***  (4.85)***  (24.34)*** 
Wave 1995-1997  -0.704  -0.383  -0.307 
 (7.05)***  (3.98)***  (2.12)** 
Wave 1999-2000  -0.724  -0.585  -0.394 
 (3.67)***  (6.07)***  (1.83)* 
Baltic States  0.996  0.106  -0.886 
 (4.69)***  (0.85)  (10.97)*** 
0.122 0.000  0.035  People take more responsibility 
(47.06)*** (0.71)  (35.98)*** 
Responsibility*Baltic -0.052  0.051  0.085 
 (5.09)***  (3.65)***  (7.89)*** 
Pseudo R-squared  0.06  0.01  0.02 
Observations 8,487  9,109  8,233 
All are ordered probit regressions corrected for clusters; also, robust z-statistics in parentheses. (*) statistically 
significant at 10 percent; (**) statistically significant at 5 percent; (***) statistically significant at 1 percent. 
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5.4  Ex-Communist Countries 
In this subsection we briefly test whether our main findings hold more generally by replacing the 
Baltic states with all ex-communist countries and by replacing Finland with the Western 
European welfare states (see the precise definition above). This exercise provides a robustness 
check and also generates a much larger sample of responses, although its relative disadvantage is 
that the “experiment” is not as clean as before. (We note, however, that the levels of inequality in 
the two groups of countries were similar to each other during the study period, which was the 
reason for focusing on Western European welfare states as a comparison group.) 
As is seen from Table 7, the qualitative results almost exactly match those in Table 4. In 
particular, the dummy variable of ex-communist countries is positively correlated with inequality 
and with pro-competition attitudes (although the latter is only mildly significant); and is 
negatively correlated with private ownership. Thus, the pattern described above basically repeats 
itself: relative to individuals in Western European economies, ex-communist respondents seem to 
favor more inequality and competition to boost incentives, while at the same time opposing 
private ownership. 
 
Table 7. Former Communist Countries vs. Northern Welfare States 
 
 Larger  income 
differences 
Competition is good  Increase private 
ownership 
Age 35-54  -0.064  -0.061  -0.317 
 (21.21)***  (14.93)***  (13.18)*** 
Age over 55   -0.069  -0.157  -0.497 
 (12.14)***  (17.49)***  (16.51)*** 
Gender (1=male)  0.055  0.185  0.185 
 (8.06)***  (26.61)***  (15.90)*** 
Secondary education  0.337  0.040  0.092 
 (13.21)***  (1.43)  (0.78) 
Tertiary education  0.367  0.128  0.356 
 (14.06)***  (4.22)***  (2.69)*** 
Married 0.064  -0.019  -0.048 
 (7.81)***  (2.17)**  (4.18)*** 
Number of children  0.009  0.004  0.009 
 (7.35)***  (5.15)***  (4.58)*** 
Retired -0.092  -0.052  -0.222 
 (7.64)***  (4.33)***  (6.73)*** 
Unemployed -0.014  -0.101  -0.017 
 (0.96)  (3.79)***  (0.58) 
White-collar worker  0.056  0.150  0.205 
 (4.72)***  (12.17)***  (22.30)***   24
Table 7., continued 
 
 Larger  income 
differences 
Competition is good  Increase private 
ownership 
Scale of incomes  0.056  0.035  0.041 
 (11.30)***  (15.35)***  (24.03)*** 
Former communist  0.472  0.116  -0.509 
 (5.74)***  (1.81)*  (5.80)*** 
Wave 1995-1997  -0.449  -0.348  -0.708 
 (4.19)***  (5.82)***  (4.34)*** 
Wave 1999-2000  -0.645  -0.217  0.062 
 (5.05)***  (3.15)***  (0.31) 
Observations 36,333  39,221  34,093 
Pseudo R-squared  0.02  0.01  0.05 
 
All are ordered probit regressions corrected for clusters; also, robust z-statistics in parentheses (*) statistically 
significant at 10 percent; (**) statistically significant at 5 percent; (***) statistically significant at 1 percent. Northern 
Welfare States include Norway, Denmark, and Sweden. Former communist countries include Albania, Bulgaria, parts 
of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Belarus, Georgia, Russian Federation, 
and Ukraine. 
 
5.5 Making Sense of the Results 
How can one reconcile the Baltic (and, more generally, ex-communist) states’ apparent 
willingness to increase inequality and competition while at the same time retaining or even 
increasing state ownership? To provide at least some tentative answers to this question, we now 
focus more closely on the determinants of the latter.   
5.5.1 Trust  
It has recently been noted that trust affects attitudes and economic behavior in a significant way; 
for example, trusting individuals are more open to trade opportunities (see Guiso et al., 2006, for a 
review). Along these lines, one can theorize that trusting individuals may be less suspicious of 
private ownership. In contrast, less trusting people may suspect potential fraud and cheating—
especially in a context where regulatory ability is weak—as a result of private ownership. To test 
this hypothesis, we employ a dummy variable obtained by the re-codification of responses to a 
question in the WVS as follows:  
Most people can be trusted: 0 = need to be very careful; 1= most people can be trusted. 
Adding this variable to the base specification, the results in Table 8 imply that, generally, 
trust is positively associated with supporting inequality, competition, and private ownership, 
which is consistent with the results in Guiso et al. (2006). The Baltics interaction variable is 
significant in explaining larger income differences, implying that trust does play a larger role in 
the Baltic states in this regard; but its significance is small when explaining attitudes to   25
competition and to private ownership. It seems therefore that trust alone cannot explain the 
puzzle.
14 
Table 8. Baltic Countries and Finland: Trust 
 
  Larger income differences  Competition is good  Increase private 
ownership 
Age  35-54  -0.257 -0.188 -0.042 
 (7.20)***  (17.16)***  (1.19) 
Age 55 and above   -0.032  -0.075  0.122 
 (4.12)***  (3.54)***  (1.69)* 
Gender  (1=male)  0.258 0.102 0.089 
 (18.74)***  (16.83)***  (4.13)*** 
Secondary education  0.164  -0.149  -0.025 
 (22.40)***  (4.39)***  (3.40)*** 
Tertiary education  0.273  -0.151  0.105 
  (9.76)*** (1.24) (3.05)*** 
Married 0.052  -0.082  -0.122 
 (5.61)***  (4.06)***  (23.31)*** 
Number of children  -0.011  0.027  0.018 
 (11.60)***  (8.79)***  (8.91)*** 
Retired  -0.183 -0.083 -0.472 
 (36.64)***  (13.07)***  (6.87)*** 
Unemployed -0.156  0.021  -0.094 
 (20.94)***  (1.45)  (6.69)*** 
White-collar  worker  0.286 0.220 0.266 
 (16.80)***  (8.20)***  (9.52)*** 
Scale of incomes  0.065  0.041  0.032 
 (10.66)***  (5.40)***  (8.47)*** 
Wave  1995-1997  -0.723 -0.407 -0.383 
 (6.81)***  (5.08)***  (2.40)** 
Wave  1999-2000  -0.656 -0.588 -0.386 
 (3.88)***  (5.68)***  (1.73)* 
Baltic States  0.422  0.371  -0.582 
  (2.72)*** (4.59)*** (8.03)*** 
Most people can be 
trusted 
-0.138 0.091 0.084 
  (18.45)*** (27.32)*** (21.64)*** 
Trust*Baltic 0.170  -0.082  0.075 
 (12.45)***  (1.67)*  (1.87)* 
Pseudo  R-squared  0.04 0.01 0.02 
Observations  8,409 9,031 8,142 
All are ordered probit regressions corrected for clusters; also, robust z-statistics in parentheses. (*) statistically 
significant at 10 percent; (**) statistically significant at 5 percent; (***) statistically significant at 1 percent. 
 
5.5.2 Confidence in Government 
Another potentially useful suggestion comes from Di Tella and MacCulloch (2004), who find that 
individuals in developing countries, possibly because of a lack of confidence in their 
governments, tend to disapprove of capitalistic institutions. Consequently, the regressions in 
                                                           
14 We also tested another trust-related variable, confidence in government, and obtained similar results.   26
Table 9 include new variables that capture confidence in the government and the political system 
as well as the perceived degree of corruption and their interactions with the Baltic countries 
dummy. The expected results here are that perception of government effectiveness will lead to a 
more favorable attitude and confidence in market economy institutions. Our findings are 
consistent with Di Tella and MacCulloch (2004); we obtain positive signs in the corresponding 
coefficient linked with the confidence variable, implying that individuals with more confidence in 
the government are also pro-market. The signs on the Baltics interaction term indicate that the 
relationship between confidence in government and support for market institutions is stronger in 
the Baltic states. While the significance of the Baltics dummy is reduced in some specifications, it 
still remains quite robust.
15  
                                                           
15 Note that these results are based on the WVS surveys for the 1995-1997 and 1999-2001 rounds in the case of the 
confidence variable and for 1995-1997 only for the corruption variable, as the related questions were not included in 
all the survey waves.   27
Table 9. Baltic Countries and Finland: Political Corruption and Confidence in Government 
 
  Larger income differences  Competition is good  Increase private ownership 
Age  35-54  -0.255 -0.230  -0.181 -0.154  -0.054  -0.049 
 (8.53)***  (17.35)***  (19.60)***  (17.57)***  (2.04)**  (2.59)*** 
Age 55 and above   -0.099  0.009  -0.061  0.033  0.085  0.123 
 (7.71)***  (1.74)*  (3.41)***  (5.45)***  (1.72)*  (3.95)*** 
Gender (1=male)  0.255  0.250  0.092  0.098  0.078  0.104 
  (21.29)*** (23.58)***  (24.06)*** (33.61)***  (4.05)***  (12.68)*** 
Secondary education  0.169  0.151  -0.138  -0.148  -0.019  -0.073 
 (28.16)***  (34.67)***  (6.39)***  (13.64)***  (1.34)  (6.83)*** 
Tertiary education  0.264  0.304  -0.152  -0.271  0.156  0.240 
 (5.37)***  (3.20)***  (1.21)  (1.68)*  (2.10)**  (1.67)* 
Married 0.045  0.083  -0.071  -0.137  -0.146  -0.139 
 (13.78)***  (14.10)***  (3.88)***  (12.99)***  (23.42)***  (19.00)*** 
Number of children  -0.008  -0.008  0.028  0.029  0.018  0.021 
 (9.27)***  (22.41)***  (11.78)***  (18.85)***  (11.69)***  (45.71)*** 
Retired  -0.157 -0.243  -0.120 -0.108  -0.430  -0.466 
  (20.53)*** (69.35)***  (20.79)*** (34.61)***  (8.84)***  (12.87)*** 
Unemployed -0.157  -0.156  0.016  0.014  -0.098  -0.106 
 (17.42)***  (26.74)***  (1.34)  (1.85)*  (9.40)***  (8.41)*** 
White-collar worker  0.283  0.297  0.224  0.230  0.268  0.278 
  (13.78)*** (25.29)***  (12.53)*** (22.88)***  (10.72)***  (14.03)*** 
Scale of incomes  0.064  0.052  0.043  0.054  0.035  0.033 
 (11.40)***  (21.20)***  (6.78)***  (18.33)***  (18.02)***  (5.79)*** 
Wave  1995-1997  -0.741   -0.451   -0.413   
 (4.41)***    (3.57)***    (2.11)**   
Baltic States  0.545  0.409  0.329  0.396  -0.560  -0.626 
 (3.12)***  (4.05)***  (3.30)***  (3.97)***  (6.97)***  (9.51)*** 
Extent of political corruption    -0.230    0.075    -0.010 
   (268.75)***   (182.10)***    (1.97)** 
Corruption*Baltic   0.265    -0.120    -0.007 
   (2.70)***    (1.12)    (0.17) 
Confidence in the government  0.109    0.087    0.016   
 (92.70)***    (120.59)***    (18.74)***   
Confidence*Baltics  -0.130   -0.041   -0.177   
 (3.90)***    (0.65)    (4.64)***   
Pseudo  R-squared  0.04 0.03  0.01 0.01  0.02  0.02 
Observations 5,999  3,520  5,994  3,506  5,879  3,484 
   
All are ordered probit regressions corrected for clusters; also, robust z-statistics in parentheses. (*) statistically significant at 10 percent; (**) 
statistically significant at 5 percent; (***) statistically significant at 1 percent. Columns (1), (3), and (5) include data for the 1990-1993 and 
the 1995-1997 survey rounds only. Columns (2), (4), and (6) are only for the 1995-1997 round. 
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6. Concluding Remarks 
Using otherwise previously similar groups of countries—Finland versus the Baltic states—this 
paper documents significant differences in attitudes toward redistribution and markets among 
citizens in capitalist countries and in ex-communist countries in transition. Further, these attitudes 
changed very little in the course of the transition decade, despite significant changes in the 
economic system such as pro-market trends. These differences, however, are seemingly 
inconsistent: while approving larger income differences and competition, the respondents from 
the Baltic states also favor more state ownership than those in Finland. Whereas the latter finding 
accords well with earlier work (Corneo and Gruner, 2002, and Alesina and Fuchs-Schuendeln, 
2005), our other findings lead us to disagree with the tenor of these papers’ conclusions—that 
communist indoctrination and/or institutions were successful in instilling anti-capitalist attitudes 
in the citizens of ex-communist countries. Specifically, in regard to some important features of 
capitalism, the respondents from the Baltic states display definitely more pro-capitalist attitudes 
than those from Finland—which is, of course, consistent with the course of transition events, in 
particular the often sweeping market reforms. Similar results hold, more generally, for other ex-
communist countries. We therefore tend to qualify the earlier works’ conclusions, arguing that 
imposed institutions, in this case at least, have had a limited effect on individual attitudes. 
We also find that trust and confidence in government are associated with pro-capitalist 
attitudes, as suggested by other related work, such as Guiso et al. (2006) and Di Tella and 
MacCulloch (2004). Yet, these factors do not fully account for the differences between the 
respondents in the Baltic states and Finland. 
The presented pattern of attitudes being complex and puzzling, we can only hypothesize 
why citizens in ex-communist countries favor more competition and larger income differences 
while at the same time supporting state ownership. Our sense is that—contrary to the previously 
offered theories—they in fact oppose leaving communist institutions such as egalitarianism and 
central planning in place. On the other hand, they were reluctant to completely dismantle the 
social protection system offered by the state. While, unfortunately, existing data do not enable us 
to directly test this hypothesis, such research would be indicative of the type of reforms that are 
likely to enjoy popular support in the course of institutional change.      29
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Appendix 1. Description of Variables 
 
Larger income differences  Answer to the question: OPINION ABOUT INCOME REDISTRIBUTION  
How would you place your views on this scale? 1 means you agree completely 
with the statement on the left (Incomes should be made more equal.); 10 means 
you agree completely with the statement on the right (We need larger income 
differences as incentives.). 
Competition is good  Answer to the question: OPINION ABOUT COMPETITION  
How would you place your views on this scale? 1 means you agree completely 
with the statement on the left (Competition is harmful. It brings out the worst in 
people.); 10 means you agree completely with the statement on the right 
(Competition is good. It stimulates people to work hard and develop new ideas.)
Increase private ownership  Answer to the question: OPINION ABOUT GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP 
How would you place your views on this scale? 1= Government ownership of 
business and industry should increase. 10= Private ownership of business and 
industry should increase. 
Age 35-54  Dummy variable that equals 1 when the respondent is between 35 and 54 years 
old. 
Age 55 or more 
Dummy variable that equals 1 when the respondent has more than 55 years old 
Gender  Dummy variable that equals 1 when the respondent is male and 0 when is 
female. 
Secondary education 
Dummy variable that equals 1 when the respondent has secondary education. 
Tertiary education  Dummy variable that equals 1 when the respondent has attended to college or 
university. 
Married  Dummy variable that equals 1 when the respondent is formally married, or lives 
for a long time with a stable partner; and 0 otherwise. 
Number of children  Number of children in the respondents' household. 
Retired  Dummy variable that equals 1 when the respondent has retired from work. 
Unemployed 
Dummy variable that equals 1 when the respondent has no formal job. 
White-collar worker  Dummy variable that equals 1 when the respondent works as a professional 
worker,  non-manual supervisor, non-manual office worker, or a foreman 
supervisor; and 0 otherwise. 
Income deciles  Deciles of income constructed within each country. The respondents are asked 
to place themselves in the income ladder of the country according to their 
incomes. 
Wave 1990-1993  Dummy variable that equals 1 when the observation corresponds to the 1990-
1993 round of the survey; and 0 otherwise. 
Wave 1995-1997  Dummy variable that equals 1 when the observation corresponds to the 1995-
1997 round of the survey; and 0 otherwise. 
Wave 1999-2001  Dummy variable that equals1 when the observation corresponds to the 1999-
2001 round of the survey; and 0 otherwise. 
Communist between 1918-1990  Dummy variable that equals 1 when the respondent was interviewed in Belarus, 
Georgia, Russian Federation, or Ukraine; and 0 otherwise. 
Communist between 1945-1990  Dummy variable that equals 1 when respondent was interviewed in Albania, 
Bulgaria,parts of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, East Germany, Hungary, 
Poland, or Romania; and 0 otherwise. 
Northern welfare states  Dummy variable that equals 1 when the respondent was interviewed in 
Denmark, Norway, or Sweden; and 0 otherwise. 
Baltic states  Dummy variable that equals 1 when the respondent was interviewed in 
Lithuania, Estonia, or Latvia; and 0 otherwise.   32
Finland  Dummy variable that equals 1 when the respondent was interviewed in Finland; 
and 0 otherwise. 
People take more responsibility  Answer to the question: GOVERNMENT MORE RESPONSIBILITY. 
How would you place your views on this scale? 1 means you agree 
completely with the statement on the left (People should take more 
responsibility to provide for themselves.); 10 means you agree completely 
with the statement on the right (The government should take more 
responsibility.) 
Confidence in the government  Dummy variable obtained by recodifying the question: CONFIDENCE IN THE 
GOVERNMENT AND THE POLITICAL SYSTEM: 0= not very much or not 
at all; 1= a great deal or quite a lot. 
Extent of government corruption  Dummy variable obtained by  recodifying the following question: EXTENT OF 
POLITICAL CORRUPTION: 0 = almost none or very few public officers are 
corrupt; 1= Most or almost all public officers are corrupt. 
Most people can be trusted  Dummy variable obtained by  recodifying the following question: MOST 
PEOPLE CAN BE TRUSTED: 0 = need to be very careful; 1= most people can 
be trusted. 
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Appendix 2. Descriptive Statistics 
   Observations Mean  Std. Dev. Min  Max 
Larger income differences  59,841  5.8  2.9  1  10 
Competition is good  63,566  7.2  2.4  1  10 
Increase  private  ownership  56,112 4.8 2.9  1  10 
Age  35-54  71,722 0.4 0.5  0  1 
Age 55 or more  71,722  0.3  0.5  0  1 
Gender (Male = 1)  73,495  0.5  0.5  0  1 
Secondary  education  56,866 0.6 0.5  0  1 
Tertiary  education  56,866 0.1 0.3  0  1 
Married  74,359 0.6 0.5  0  1 
Number  of  children  74,130 3.2 2.9  0  20 
Retired  71,662 0.3 0.4  0  1 
Unemployed  71,662 0.1 0.3  0  1 
White-collar  worker  64,038 0.4 0.5  0  1 
Income  deciles  63,756 4.5 2.4  1  10 
Wave  1990-1993  74,584 0.0 0.2  0  1 
Wave  1995-1997  74,584 0.9 0.3  0  1 
Wave  1999-2001  74,584 0.1 0.2  0  1 
Communist between 1918-1990  74,584  0.6  0.5  0  1 
Communist between 1945-1990  74,584  0.1  0.3  0  1 
Northern welfare states  74,584  0.0  0.1  0  1 
Baltic  states  74,584 0.0 0.1  0  1 
Finland  74,584 0.2 0.4  0  1 
People take more responsibility  65,797  4.4  2.8  1  10 
Confidence in the government  37,059  0.3  0.5  0  1 
Extent of government corruption  22,263  0.7  0.4  0  1 
Most people can be trusted  71,007  0.3  0.5  0  1 
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Appendix 3. Pairwise Correlation Matrix  

























0.216                          Competition is 
good  0.000                         
-0.021  0.247                       Increase private 
ownership  0.000  0.000                      
Age  35-54  0.023  0.010  0.044                     
  0.000  0.010  0.000                     
Age  55  or  more  -0.113  -0.098  -0.232  -0.533                    
  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000                    
Gender  0.043  0.073  0.105  0.051  -0.075                   
  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000                   
0.208  0.005  -0.121  0.129 -0.249 0.020                    Secondary 
education  0.000  0.247  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000                 
0.141 0.074  0.074  0.037  -0.120  -0.016  -0.406                Tertiary 
education  0.000 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000               
Married 0.078  0.032  0.019  0.178  -0.116  0.179  0.064  0.046             
 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000             
-0.069 0.017  0.113  -0.171  -0.050  0.071  -0.094  -0.045  -0.265            Number of 
children  0.000 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000           
Retired  -0.141  -0.107  -0.228  -0.386 0.781 -0.111 -0.251  -0.135 -0.161 -0.021           
 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000  0.000           
Unemployed  -0.066  -0.022  0.060  0.072 -0.173 0.071 0.025  -0.059  -0.049  0.092  -0.194        
  0.000  0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000         
0.099 0.082  0.138  0.083  -0.117  -0.227 0.041  0.315 0.062 -0.079 -0.107 -0.073        White-collar 
worker  0.000 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000       
Income  deciles  0.233  0.115  0.111  0.110 -0.225 0.111 0.137  0.203 0.274  -0.106  -0.297 -0.153 0.187     
 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000  0.000     
0.120 0.104  0.362  0.045  -0.161  0.072 -0.033  0.026 0.070 0.046  -0.165 0.015 0.100  0.116    People take 
more 
responsibility  0.000 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000  0.000 0.000   
0.027 0.032  0.066  -0.053  0.105  0.003  -0.044 -0.024  -0.014  0.031  0.110 -0.022 -0.003  -0.034  0.046  Confidence in 
the government  0.000 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.611 0.000  0.000 0.009 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.622  0.000  0.000 
p-values in second row   35
  Appendix 4. Selected Marginal Effects from Ordered Probits 
   P [Y=1/X]  P [Y=2/X]  P [Y=9/X]  P [Y=10/X] 
Larger income differences                         
Wave 1995-1997  0.117  ***  0.045  ***  -0.042  ***  -0.052  *** 
Wave 1999-2000  0.201  **  0.034  ***  -0.015  ***  -0.012  *** 
Baltic States  -0.093  ***  -0.033  ***  0.026  *  0.029  * 
Competition is good                 
Wave 1995-1997  0.007  ***  0.007  ***  -0.035  ***  -0.112  *** 
Wave 999-2000  0.028  **  0.021  ***  -0.056  ***  -0.099  *** 
Baltic States  -0.006  ***  -0.006  ***  0.028  ***  0.084  *** 
Increase private ownership                      
Wave 1995-1997  0.016  **  0.007  *  -0.025  *  -0.090  * 
Wave 1999-2000  0.031    0.011    -0.025    -0.059  * 
Baltic States  0.056  ***  0.018  ***  -0.037  ***  -0.085  *** 
Marginal effects calculated after ordered probits in Table 4. We only show some interest coefficients, but 
the complete results can be provided upon request to the authors. All regressions include country clusters; 
also, standard errors are robust. (*) statistically significant at 10 percent; (**) statistically significant at 5 
percent; (***) statistically significant at 1 percent. 
 
 